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Abstract
There is some evidence that female sex workers (FSWs) receive greater earnings for providing un-
protected sex. In 2003, the landscape of the fight against HIV/AIDS dramatically changed in India
with the introduction of Avahan, the largest HIV prevention programme implemented globally.
Using a unique, cross-sectional bio-behavioural dataset from 3591 FSWs located in the four Indian
states where Avahan was implemented, we estimate the economic loss faced by FSWs who always
use condoms. We estimate the causal effect of condom use on the price charged during the last
paid sexual intercourse using the random targeting of Avahan as an instrumental variable. Results
indicate that FSWs who always use condoms face an income loss of 65% (INR125, US$2.60) per
sex act compared to peers providing unprotected sex, consistent with our expectations. The main
finding confirms that clients have a preference for unprotected sex and that policies aiming at
changing clients’ preferences and at improving the bargaining power of FSWs are required to limit
the spread of HIV.
Keywords: HIV prevention, condom use, instrumental variables, compensating differential, sex work, India
Key Messages
• Using data from 3591 female sex workers (FSWs) located in four Indian states where the Avahan programme was imple-
mented, we estimate the loss faced by FSWs who always use condoms.
• We use an instrumental variable to correct for endogeneity in the impact of condom use on act price.
• We find that FSWs who always use condoms face income losses of 78%, INR150 ($2.35) per act, compared to their peers
who offer unprotected sex.
VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unre-
stricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 1
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Introduction
HIV prevalence in India is <1% in the general population, but fe-
male sex workers (FSWs) are up to 25 times more likely to be HIV
positive than other women (Ramesh et al., 2008). Many FSWs in
India report violence and intimidation by clients and the police, with
experience of violence strongly associated with inconsistent condom
use and lower levels of participation in HIV and sexually transmit-
ted infection (STI) prevention activities (Beattie et al., 2010). In the
context of heightened economic and structural inequities, FSWs are
highly financially dependent on sex work to support themselves and
their families (Bharat et al., 2013; Dasgupta, 2013; Sahni and
Shankar, 2013). As a result, FSWs often need to make difficult deci-
sions regarding their own health, alongside ensuring economic and
social stability for themselves and their dependents.
There is evidence in the economic literature that FSWs face a
positive price premium for unprotected sex, defined as the condom
differential (Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005; de la Torre et al.,
2010; Robinson and Yeh, 2011; Arunachalam and Shah, 2013;
Muravyev and Talavera, 2013; Cunningham and Kendall, 2014;
Egger and Lindenblatt, 2015). In those studies, while the condom
differential is always positive, it varies from a reduction in the price
for protected sex of 81% (Bangladesh) to 7% (Belgium and
Netherlands), though varying statistical methods make direct com-
parisons of this premium challenging.
In the face of a growing and predominantly heterosexually
driven HIV epidemic, India experienced a major change in the fight
of HIV/AIDS with the introduction of the largest HIV prevention
initiative implemented globally: Avahan—the Hindi word for ‘wel-
come’. Avahan was introduced in 2003 in four Southern Indian
states in order to address proximal and distal determinants of HIV
risk. It delivered a comprehensive package of HIV prevention serv-
ices including peer-education, STI treatment, condom promotion
and distribution, and community mobilization to reduce social
stigma (Ramakrishnan et al., 2010). Non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) working with key populations (FSWs, their clients
and men who have sex with men) were provided grants by the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation to provide those HIV prevention
services. Many employed peer educators, current or former FSWs
received training on HIV prevention and Avahan service delivery,
before providing those services to an average of 25–50 persons at
high risk of HIV. Peer educators shared prevention information, dis-
tributed condoms and lubricants, and provided referral for the man-
agement of STIs. Avahan achieved an exceptional scale-up of HIV
prevention services, reaching 725 040 high-risk persons between
2004 and 2007, distributing 177 million condoms and conducting
529 381 STI tests (Ramakrishnan et al., 2010; Verma et al., 2010).
In this study, we estimate the economic loss faced by FSWs who
always use condoms. We estimate the causal effect of condom use
on the price charged during the last paid sexual intercourse using the
random targeting of Avahan as an instrumental variable, analysing a
cross-sectional survey dataset collected 28–37 months after the
introduction of Avahan activities. This dataset is much larger than
others in the economics literature, containing price data from over
3500 FSWs. In line with earlier studies, we use intervention expos-
ure as an instrumental variable to correct for endogeneity bias, as a
number of factors could affect both condom and price negotiation.
Table 1 shows that in the literature, the price premium for un-
protected sex is highly context specific ranging from <10% in the
USA (Cunningham and Kendall, 2016), Belgium and Netherlands
(Adriaenssens and Hendrickx, 2012) and Kenya (Robinson and
Yeh, 2011) to around 80% in India (Rao et al., 2003) and
Bangladesh (Islam and Smyth, 2012). While there have been several
studies that aimed to measure the condom differential price, there is
no evidence of the size of the condom premium in the context of in-
tensive HIV prevention.
Measuring the causal effect of condom use on prices charged for
sex is challenging because many factors that may have a critical im-
pact on both price are condom use are often not measured in surveys
and will confound the effect. For example, those factors may include
unobserved characteristics of a FSW and her client that might influ-
ence both the price bargaining and condom bargaining, such as ne-
gotiation skills, past experiences during negotiation (e.g. violence),
drug use and the immediate need for cash. Even when observed, the
reliability and validity of some factors can often be questioned.
Therefore, simply regressing the price charged for sex on condom
use will fall short in estimating a causal effect of condom use on
price, and result in a biased estimate; this is the endogeneity
problem.
There have been many attempts in the literature to overcome the
endogeneity problem in estimating the impact of condom use on
price charged for sex. Table 1 shows that published studies either
used a fixed effect estimator that accounts for time-invariant unob-
served characteristics of FSWs or an instrumental variable that indu-
ces an exogenous variation in condom use in order to overcome
endogeneity. Evidence from studies that used an instrumental vari-
able approach highlighted that the endogeneity bias resulted in an
underestimation of the effect of condom use on price, suggesting
that omitted variables may be positively correlated with condom use
and the price charged (e.g. bargaining power).
Methods
Data and study setting
In 2003, Avahan was implemented among FSWs and other key
populations Activities included condom promotion, STI manage-
ment and creating an environment where safe sex was socially
accepted (Chandrasekaran et al., 2008). The intervention aimed
to reach 80% of all high-risk groups, including FSWs and their
clients. To assist in the evaluation of the programme, several
cross-sectional bio-behavioural surveys [Integrated Behavioural
and Biological Assessments (IBBAs)] were carried out, and infor-
mation on the construction and implementation of the pro-
gramme and IBBA surveys has been widely published elsewhere
(Ramesh et al., 2008; Saidel et al., 2008; Deering et al., 2011;
Pickles et al., 2013). The IBBAs aimed to inform a population-
level analysis of Avahan in a causal-pathway-based modelling
analysis (Pickles et al., 2013), were carried out as face-to-face
interviews using a culturally sensitive and context-specific ques-
tionnaire translated into the local languages, alongside the collec-
tion of blood samples.
We use cross-sectional data gathered between 2006 and 2009,
between 28 and 37 months after the start of Avahan. As described in
detail elsewhere (Saidel et al., 2008), data were gathered via cultur-
ally sensitive and context-specific questionnaires from 3591 FSWs
sampled through a two-stage cluster process in 118 districts in four
states; Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
Data were available for two other states (Manipur and Nagaland);
however, due to a substantively different epidemic context, specific-
ally the prevalence of injecting drug use, we elect not to include this
state in this analysis.1 Sampling weights are used in this analysis for
each district, proportional to the number of FSWs estimated to sell
sex in the district and typology of FSW.
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Empirical model
We use a standard two-stage least squared (2SLS) approach to cor-
rect for endogeneity in estimating the effect of condom use on price.
The first stage estimates:
C^i ¼ d0 þ d1Xi þ d2Zi þ ri; (1)
where C^i is a binary outcome variable denoting consistent condom
use and coded 1 if a FSW reported using condoms all of the time
with occasional and regular clients, and 0 otherwise. Note that the
IBBAs did not collect data on types of sex act (e.g. vaginal, oral or
anal), so we are not able to explore this variation in condom use. Xi
a vector of FSW characteristics, Zi our instrument and ri the error
term. We define our instrument as whether FSWs obtained their last
condom from an Avahan peer educator/outreach worker. All
respondents were asked where the last condom was obtained from.
We code the subsequent variable 1 if the answer is a peer educator/
outreach worker (75%) or NGO outreach van (6%), and 0 if any
other answer. Those answers include shop (1%), pharmacy (3%),
client (4%), hospital (1%), bar (4%), brothel madam (2%) and
other (4%). Note that the high proportion who received a condom
from Avahan is high (81%) because of the large size of this preven-
tion project. In fact, all FSWs located in an Avahan state were at
least reached once by Avahan. For brevity, we refer to this as the
‘last condom’ instrument. We argue that this instrument does not
violate the exclusion criterion as condom distribution depended en-
tirely on outreach worker workload and not on the characteristics
of FSWs to whom condoms were distributed. We explore this intu-
ition further in robustness checks in the Results section.
We substitute C^i into:
Pi ¼ b0 þ b1Xi þ b2C^i þ ei; (2)
where Pi denotes the price a FSW charged in the last commercial
act. ei is the error term.
Variable specification
Xi contains a number of relevant covariates. First, we consider the type
of alternative employment available to FSWs as this may affect the
quantity and type of sex she needs to sell to earn a living (Reed et al.,
2010; Mccarthy et al., 2014). Second, the environment where FSWs
entertain clients, e.g. a secure indoor setting vs a less-safe street setting,
can affect price (Dandona et al., 2005; Shannon et al., 2009). Third,
having young dependents (we define as children under 5years of age)
has been shown to be negatively associated with price (Evans and
Lambert, 2008; Papworth et al., 2015). Fourth, we consider FSW com-
munity cohesion proxied by a variable denoting whether or not a
woman feels a strong sense of unity with other FSWs. Finally, we in-
clude recent experience of violence (in the past 6 months); this has been
associated with a reduced likelihood of condom use in commercial acts,
particularly where sex work is criminalized and FSWs subsequently op-
erate in more insecure, isolated spaces (Deering et al., 2013). Violence
towards FSWs can be enabled by unsupportive institutions, often signals
isolation or disempowerment of the FSW community, and substantively
impacts negotiation between FSWs and clients (Siegfried et al., 2003;
Shannon and Csete, 2010; Shannon et al., 2015).
Characteristics of women in sex work that objectively appeal to
all clients, including various physical or personality features, are dif-
ficult to measure. The economic literature has typically simplified
these features by attempting to capture the physical attractiveness of
FSWs or clients (Arunachalam and Shah, 2012; Islam and Smyth,
2012). Outside of sex work, there is some evidence from labour eco-
nomics that attractiveness is associated with better bargaining out-
comes, more generous treatment and greater cooperation in
negotiation (Mulford et al., 1998; Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999;
Rosenblat, 2008). Ultimately, these physical or personality traits in-
fluence the price charged by FSWs. The IBBA surveys do not contain
direct measures of attractiveness, so we created a set of proxy varia-
bles that encompass multiple features of bargaining power and ac-
knowledge economic work on the influence of physical features:
FSW education (a binary variable if the FSW is literate); the number
of children she has, the ratio of her age divided by her tenure in sex
work (in years) and whether she is currently married. We control for
a FSW’s use of non-condom forms of contraception including oral
pills, IUDs, injections and sterilization.
We log-transform the dependent variable price, Pi, due to it
being right-skewed. Where interpreted, the effect of the binary con-
dom use variable on price is calculated using Giles’ method (1982):
%D Priceð Þ ¼ 100 eb2  1ð Þ; (4)
where b2 is the condom use coefficient.
Table 1. Summary of selected economic studies estimating the condom differential
Authors Date of
publication
Setting Number of
Acts
Number of
FSWs
Strategy to overcome
endogeneity
Adriaenssens and Hendrickx 2012 Belgium and
The Netherlands
25 000þ 6400þ Fixed effects
Arunachalam and Shah 2013 Ecuador 8500 2800 Fixed effects
Cunningham and Kendall 2014 USA 2047 685 Fixed effects
de la Torre et al. 2010 Mexico 429 429 Paired price model
Egger and Lindblatt 2015 Germany 16 583 2517 Instrumental variables (prior average risk taking of
other sex workers, and the average height of other
sex workers)
Gertler, Shah and Bertozzi 2005 Mexico 4000 1029 Fixed effects
Islam and Smyth 2012 Bangladesh 283 283 Instrumental variable (participation in a safe sex train-
ing programme)
Manda 2013 Kenya 19 041 192 Fixed effects
Muravyev and Talavera 2015 UK 13 876 3877 Fixed effects
Rao et al. 2003 India 608 608 Instrumental variable (participation in safe sex training
programme)
Robinson and Yeh 2011 Kenya 19 041 192 Fixed effects
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Results
Descriptive statistics
Data were from 3591 FSWs from 118 districts in four states and
Table 2 summarizes key descriptive statistics. The median price per
act in the sample was INR200 (US$4.13); although 90% of FSWs
charged less than INR500 ($10.33), the maximum recorded figure
(INR4000 US$82.66) was 20 times the median. On average, FSWs
worked 4.3 days per week and had 2.6 clients per day. Mean daily
earnings from sex work were around INR700 (US$11), over 6 times
greater than the average daily wage for a non-salaried Indian
woman of around INR110 (US$2.27) (Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Information, 2013).
The median age of the sample was 31 years (interquartile range
(IQR): 26–38) and average duration in sex work was 4 years (IQR:
2–8). The median number of regular and occasional clients in the
last 10 days were 7 (IQR: 5–8) and 3 (IQR: 2–5), respectively.
Although the median age of entry into sex work was 25 years (IQR:
21–31), 287 (8%) report beginning sex work under the age of 18. A
large proportion (3303, 92%) of FSWs reported having children,
and the median number of children of women in the sample was 2
(IQR: 1–3). Overall, 1400 (39%) of participants reported being able
to read and write, 2262 (63%) were married and 2190 (61%)
reported using non-condom contraception. Finally, 3124 (87%) of
women in the study reported consistent condom use with all clients.
We restrict our sample to those who have been reached by Avahan,
with the mean length of time since first contact of 140 weeks.
Table 2 shows the variable used to construct our instrument, where
a FSW obtained her last condom, with 2944 (82%) of women
obtaining their last condom from a peer/support worker or NGO
van.
Econometric results
Table 3a presents ordinary least squares (OLS) model estimates.
This specification suggests condom use has a small and non-
significant negative effect on price (P-value¼0.72). Table 3b(i)
displays our main model, an instrumental variable (IV) estimation
of equation (2) using the last condom instrument in the 2SLS re-
gression. Table 3b(ii) gives the first-stage output, equation (1).
There is strong evidence (P<0.05) that condom use is negatively
associated with price per act, and on average a FSW who always
uses condoms will face income losses of 65%, or INR125 ($2.60)
per act compared to her peers who offer unprotected sex, which is
close to the 79% obtained in Rao et al. (2003). The difference be-
tween OLS and IV estimates suggests that, as anticipated, not con-
trolling for omitted variable bias in the OLS specification leads to
the underestimation of the effect of condom use on price.
Furthermore, we note that the magnitude and direction of other
variables do not change substantially between the two
specifications.
While not the main focus of the article, the results highlight that
other factors affect prices charged for sex work. Prices are higher for
FSWs who are literate (n¼1485, 39%), or currently married (2343,
62%), but lower for those who are HIV positive (588, 16%); find-
ings consistent with the economic literature on attractiveness. There
is some evidence (P¼0.07) that feeling a strong sense of unity with
other FSWs is associated with a higher price charged.
As a first robustness check, we use an alternative indicator of
Avahan exposure as instrument: number of contacts from an
Avahan-supported NGO in the last 6months. Table 3(d) displays
the results of using just this instrument, and Table 3(e) the over-
identified specification with both instruments; both show consistent
results for the coefficient of interest, and the effect of covariates on
price. We apply the Sargan test (Sargan, 1958) to the over-identified
model and are unable to reject the null hypothesis that both instru-
ments are valid.
Instrument validity
It is simple to test the explanatory power of our instrument on con-
dom use, and we find it exceeds the conventional benchmarks of
F>10 in the first stage (F¼10.26), whilst the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic (18.54) performs well against Stock-Yogo critical
values exceeding the 10% maximal IV size (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
While it is not possible to test if the instrument does not violate
the exclusion restriction, we question whether FSWs who received
their last condom from Avahan were not systematically different
than those who did not receive their last condom from Avahan. To
assess the likelihood of a particular peer outreach worker contacting
a FSW, we extensively examined the strategy outreach staff used to
reach women. Peer outreach workers had a responsibility to reach
and engage with every FSW operating in an allocated geographic
area, whilst we note that this was not dependent on the place of
work since Avahan targeted all types of FSWs (including street-
based, bar-based or brothel-based FSWs). Areas were assigned by
NGOs annually and each peer outreach worker had around 50
FSWs in her network. Using key-informants and their own network,
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of study population (n¼ 3591)
Variable Mean/proportion SD
Price (2006 INR) 270 (median:
200)
235 (IQR:
100–350)
Ln(Price) 5.31 0.753
Consistent condom use with all clients 0.87 (3124) 0.343
Literate 0.39 (1400) 0.489
Age (years)/time as sex worker (years) 9.56 (34 330) 7.88
Children (number) 1.85 (6643) 1.16
Currently married 0.63 (2262) 0.484
Using non-condom contraception 0.61 (2191) 0.489
Feels strong sense of unity with other FSWs 0.86 (3088) 0.343
Has a child under 5 years old 0.27 (970) 0.445
Experienced violence in past 6 months 0.16 (575) 0.364
HIV positive 0.16 (575) 0.363
Sex work environment
Home 0.27 (970) 0.444
Rented room 0.25 (898) 0.436
Lodge 0.21 (754) 0.406
Dabha (truck stop) 0.002 (7) 0.045
Brothel 0.16 (575) 0.370
Bar/nightclub 0.001 (4) 0.036
Public place 0.01 (36) 0.299
Other 0.1 (359) 0.016
Other employment
None 0.49 (1760) 0.5
Non-agricultural labour 0.19 (682) 0.395
Petty business 0.07 (251) 0.25
Maid/servant 0.11 (395) 0.318
Agricultural labour 0.1 (359) 0.295
Artisan/handicrafts 0.03 (108) 0.183
State
Andhra Pradesh 0.2 (718) 0.393
Karnataka 0.28 (1005) 0.447
Maharashtra 0.29 (1041) 0.453
Tamil Nadu 0.22 (790) 0.415
Last condom obtained from Avahan 0.82 (2945) 0.385
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peer outreach workers aimed to regularly identify new FSWs as well
as contact each FSW in her area every 15 days; it was during these
contacts that condoms were distributed (Chandrashekar, 2014, per-
sonal communication). We argue that, because peer support workers
were required to contact every FSW regularly, the probability a FSW
was contacted (and condoms distributed) recently before they were
surveyed is independent of any of her characteristics, except perhaps
the peer outreach worker’s workload.
Alongside condom distribution, Avahan also provided informa-
tion on HIV, STI and pregnancy prevention options. It is plausible
that increasing FSWs’ knowledge of the potential consequences of
unprotected sex will increase the premium required to adequately
compensate for the risk of unprotected intercourse. If a proportion
of the population was non-randomly chosen to receive information
(or supplies of free condoms), the exclusion restriction would not be
satisfied and our results biased. Because all of the sample was
reached at some point by Avahan, we assume that knowledge of the
risks of unprotected sex is uniform across our sample and will not
directly influence price according to FSW characteristics.
Table 4 explores if there are systematic differences between
FSWs who did and did not receive their last condom from Avahan,
i.e. when Zi equals 1 and 0, respectively. We test for differences be-
tween factors included in the models above, except those which
Avahan explicitly –aimed to change since data come from after
programme implementation (using non-condom contraception and
feeling unity with other FSWs). In addition, we test for differences in
five other indicators which may signal greater or lesser FSW risk-
taking behaviours. These results generally support the argument
that condoms were distributed with little regard for FSW character-
istics, though we find that FSWs receiving their last condom from a
peer educator were more likely to be literate and less likely to be
married.
Discussion
We used Avahan outreach as an instrumental variable to investigate
the effect of using condom on the price charged in India. We esti-
mated that FSWs who provide protected intercourse face income
losses 65% or INR125 (US$2.60) per act provided compared to
their counterparts offering unprotected sex act.
Evidence suggests that the Avahan programme has been success-
ful in reducing the HIV epidemic and is estimated to have prevented
up to 600 000 infections over the decade since its introduction in
2003 (Chandrashkar et al., 2011; Pickles et al., 2013). Despite this,
our study suggests that more than 4 years after the initiation of
Avahan, FSWs continued to face heightened vulnerability to HIV
and STIs through economic pressures. Explanations for the persist-
ence of the condom differential in India can be found through
Table 3. OLS and IV results estimating the condom differential
(a) OLS (b) 2SLS (c) First stage of (b) (d) 2SLS (e) 2SLS
ln(price) SE ln(price) SE Consistent condom use ln(price) SE ln(price) SE
Instrument: Last condom No Yes No Yes
Instrument: Number of NGO contacts No No Yes Yes
Consistent condom use with all clients 0.017 0.065 1.04** 0.43 1.78** 0.89 1.19*** 0.40
Literate 0.32*** 0.044 0.36*** 0.039 0.033** 0.013 0.38*** 0.054 0.36*** 0.041
Age (years)/time as sex worker (years) 0.0029 0.0019 0.0044* 0.0022 0.0015 0.0013 0.0072** 0.0035 0.0058** 0.0026
Children (number) 0.0090 0.019 0.034 0.022 0.023*** 0.0070 0.048* 0.028 0.034 0.022
Currently married 0.16*** 0.043 0.16*** 0.036 0.0096 0.013 0.17*** 0.044 0.16*** 0.039
Using non-condom contraception 0.010 0.054 0.0057 0.041 0.0085 0.029 0.012 0.052 0.0057 0.044
Feels strong sense of unity with other FSWs 0.040 0.074 0.11* 0.059 0.050 0.047 0.14 0.089 0.11* 0.064
Has a child under 5 years old 0.071 0.041 0.065 0.041 0.0039 0.024 0.087 0.054 0.088** 0.044
Experienced violence in past 6 months 0.032 0.053 0.074 0.069 0.098*** 0.030 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.074
HIV positive 0.15** 0.052 0.14*** 0.047 0.0097 0.018 0.15** 0.060 0.15*** 0.051
Other employment:
None
Non-agricultural labour 0.073 0.080 0.15** 0.064 0.079 0.049 0.20** 0.096 0.16** 0.067
Petty business 0.020 0.092 0.068 0.089 0.058 0.038 0.12 0.10 0.093 0.091
Maid/servant 0.054 0.078 0.0004 0.063 0.053 0.044 0.052 0.087 0.020 0.065
Agricultural labour 0.32** 0.12 0.29*** 0.083 0.039 0.033 0.28*** 0.11 0.30*** 0.088
Artisan/handicrafts 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.094 0.032 0.031 0.044 0.12 0.072 0.10
States
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka 0.0023 0.22 0.079 0.066 0.072 0.047 0.15 0.11 0.099 0.072
Maharashtra 0.43*** 0.11 0.36*** 0.081 0.092** 0.040 0.34*** 0.11 0.37*** 0.083
Tamil Nadu 0.35*** 0.087 0.47*** 0.093 0.12*** 0.034 0.57*** 0.13 0.49*** 0.093
Last condom Avahan 0.12*** 0.027
Constant 5.15*** 0.13 0.78*** 0.055
Observations 3581 3581 3581 3581 3581
R2 0.3 0.03 0.119 0.336 0.017
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 18.537 5.879 10.08
Robust standard errors. For presentation due to partialling out, coefficients for place of entertainment in (a) are not shown but were included in the model. The
Stock-Yogo weak ID Test 10% and 15% critical values are 16.38 and 8.96, respectively. First-stage results of model (d) shown in Supplementary Table S1.
***P< 0.01.
**P< 0.05.
*P< 0.1.
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exploring both the supply and demand sides to understand the inter-
secting vulnerabilities faced by FSWs.
Firstly, the price premium for unprotected sex may have been
high 4 years into the Avahan intervention if the programme con-
strained the supply of unprotected sex by reducing the number of
FSWs who agree to client demands for unprotected sex. If client de-
mand remained constant, or fell at a lower rate than the supply of
unprotected sex, remaining FSWs who agreed to sex without a con-
dom would be able to command higher prices.
Secondly, FSWs may agree to better-compensated condomless
sex because of unpredictable income fluctuations. Programmes
which aim to reduce the economic vulnerability of women, such as
encouraging lending through formal microfinance or banking sys-
tems (which are often denied to FSWs due to stigmatizing structural
institutional practices) may limit FSW need to agree to sex without a
condom (Evans and Lambert, 2008), or reduce dependence on infor-
mal lending (Sherman et al., 2010).
Thirdly, our results suggest that FSWs who feel unity with col-
leagues in sex work may be able to negotiate higher prices, support-
ing the focus of many FSW programmes on supporting community
empowerment, e.g., enabling women to work collaboratively by
facilitating the development of policies surrounding condom use
that are collectively supported (Halli et al., 2006; Guha et al., 2012;
Kerrigan et al., 2015). A major barrier to the development of safer
sex work spaces is the current legal framework surrounding sex
work, where working in indoor, organized settings is criminalized,
including in southern India. Decriminalization of sex work is there-
fore crucial to address in order to support FSWs’ agency in insisting
on condom use by clients (Quast and Gonzalez, 2016; Cunningham
and Shah, 2017).
Finally, recent advances in the efficacy of bio-medical interven-
tions, which reduce the risk of contracting HIV in the absence of
condoms, are starting to change the landscape of HIV prevention
(AVAC, 2015). In addition, HIV treatment continues to be scaled-
up, decreasing the number of people living with HIV who are likely
to be infectious (National AIDS Control Organisation, 2011) al-
though implementing this in the sex work context is likely to be
challenging. Introducing treatment or prevention methods may be
seen as exogenous shocks to the market for commercial sex, yet
many trials and implementation programmes do not collect data on
market or pricing dynamics. Our results indicate that HIV
prevention programmes do not occur in a vacuum and may have in-
direct but important influences on the preferences and incentives of
FSWs and clients.
We acknowledge that our study has some limitations. As in any
application of instrumental variable methods, we are unable to test
whether our instrument operates in violation of the exclusion re-
striction. However, through exploring intuition and testing where
possible, we showed that our last condom instrument convincingly
satisfies the relevance and exogeneity conditions. One difficulty in
interpreting the estimates of IV methods is that not everybody
responds in the same way to exposure to the instrument (Angrist
and Krueger, 2001). For example, there may be a subset of FSWs
who would always (or never) provide protected intercourse, whether
or not they are contacted by Avahan or receive free condoms.
We acknowledge that the IV method may not eliminate all sour-
ces of bias. In this study, we are only able to estimate the premium
for unprotected intercourse for FSWs whose choice of using condom
has been influenced by receiving their last condom from Avahan.
Although data were captured on condom use for regular and occa-
sional clients, pricing data were not available for each group and we
were therefore unable to decompose our premium estimate by client
type. Because protection and pricing dynamics may be substantially
different with different clients, it would be useful for further work
to explore this. Finally, because information on condom used is sen-
sitive and self-reported by FSWs, our results are susceptible to ac-
ceptability biases.
Finally, because of a range of factors, including gender-based social
inequities and social stigmatization of sex work, few studies of clients
have been conducted. Gaining a better understanding of why clients
demand unprotected sex, and how this demand can be mitigated
through HIV prevention programming, is critically important to reduc-
ing HIV risk to FSWs and the overall HIV epidemic in southern India.
Conclusion
We applied instrumental variable method to a large dataset of FSWs
in India to estimate the size of the price premium for unprotected
sex, 4 years following the initiation of the Avahan HIV prevention
intervention. This study finds that a premium for unprotected sex is
almost identical to that found in previous work in India before
Avahan. After correcting for endogeneity bias, we conclude that
FSWs in southern India who report consistent condom use by clients
experienced a loss of income of 65% per sex act. Given the uncer-
tainty regarding how HIV treatment and prevention programs may
affect the commercial sex market, we recommend that such pro-
grams explicitly consider the critical role that social, structural and
economic vulnerability can play in FSW agency, and specifically de-
cision making for protected intercourse.
Note
1. We note, however, that analysis of these states indicated simi-
lar results to those included in this study, results available upon
request.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online.
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